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Financial stability in a crisis: What is the role of the central bank? 
Vittorio Corbo
1 
Financial crises are costly and complex. Authorities have limited tools to deal with a crisis 
once it has broken out: there is little they can do other than attempt to limit the damage to the 
rest of the economy. This makes prevention as important as treatment. Central banks have 
traditionally focused on treating financial crises, but they also have an important role in 
helping to prevent them. 
Preliminary: treatment and prevention 
The monetary policy rate is a blunt instrument that is not well-suited to resolve distortions in 
the financial system. But there is a growing consensus around the design and use of 
macroprudential tools, which are more flexible and can be targeted at the particular spots of 
the financial system that are creating distortions. Specifically, central banks could use cycle-
adjusted capital requirement ratios, loan loss provision ratios and lending-to-asset-value 
ratios to discourage speculation in markets where a potential bubble is forming.  
Central banks could also reduce systemic risk through improvements in the payment and 
security settlements systems and providing incentives for certain derivatives transactions to 
be settled in central counterparty institutions. 
Another way in which central banks can help prevent financial crises is by designing 
procedures to deal with the failure of systemically important institutions. The ad hoc manner 
in which this issue was dealt with during this crisis exacerbated uncertainty and damage to 
the system. Ideally, central banks could establish resolution procedures analogous to those 
of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation so that systemically important institutions 
cease being too big to fail. 
Central banks could also reduce the probability of a crisis by designing intervention 
procedures to avoid large misalignments in the real exchange rate whose reversal could be 
too costly and affect the stability of the financial system. 
Finally, central banks should work with financial institutions so that they issue contingent 
capital certificates. These are debt securities that would be converted into capital once a 
threshold is reached and so provide automatic recapitalization in the event of a crisis. 
What are the financial stability objectives in a crisis? 
A central bank’s main objective during a financial crisis is to contain the damage and limit the 
impact on the real economy. The first imperative is to restore calm in financial markets. 
Market panics create the equivalent of a financial heart attack by cutting off the flow of credit 
even to healthy institutions. This amplifies the damage in the financial system and is one of 
the main transmission channels through which a panic affects the real economy. Central 
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banks must therefore reduce uncertainty, ensure that markets for short-term credit function 
properly, and prevent the collapse of financial institutions due to liquidity restrictions. As long 
as there are no resolution mechanisms to ensure that the financial system is not damaged by 
the failure of a systemically important institution, central banks should also prevent the 
collapse of these even if they are insolvent. 
What are the appropriate central bank tools for financial stability in a 
crisis? 
The first measure that central banks use to achieve these objectives is to offer extensive 
liquidity support against good collateral at a penalty rate. This is part of a central bank’s 
traditional role as a lender of last resort, as prescribed by Bagehot (1873). However, the offer 
of this support has been limited to banks. When non-bank intermediaries are important, as is 
the case in the US financial system, central banks should also lend to these institutions 
under the same conditions. 
The second tool is the monetary policy rate. Authorities should reduce the policy rate 
aggressively in response to the projected decrease in aggregate demand so as to move the 
neutral level of the observed real policy rate closer to its new equilibrium value. 
If the second tool is exhausted (the policy rate is close to the minimum), central banks should 
also consider non-conventional measures as a third, complementary tool. One such measure 
is making an explicit commitment to keep the policy rate at a low level for an extended period 
of time, thus reducing uncertainty and potentially reducing interest rates at greater maturities. 
The effectiveness of this measure depends on a central bank’s credibility. If it is not enough, 
monetary authorities may also offer unlimited financing to the banking system (against 
appropriate collateral) at the policy rate at a longer maturity than is usual. Another non-
conventional measure is direct intervention in financial markets: the outright purchase of 
financial instruments to affect the yield curve or stimulate a systemically important credit 
market. 
When necessary, central banks may use flexibility as an additional tool. They may relax their 
collateral requirements and lend against a wider variety of instruments. They may also 
arrange cross-currency swaps with foreign central banks to provide liquidity denominated in 
foreign currency. 
Finally, central banks may cooperate with fiscal authorities when a crisis calls for additional 
support in the form of government insurance or capital infusions. 
What are the implications for monetary policy? 
The monetary policy framework will most likely expand to consider asset prices – and 
perhaps the growth of monetary aggregates and credit, as well – in some way. The high cost 
of the current crisis has highlighted the importance of preventing crises, and this suggests 
that monetary policy will shift from a “clean up after the bubble” stance towards a more active 
“lean against the wind” stance to deter the formation of asset price bubbles. 
However, this will be anything but easy to implement in practice. There is a trade-off between 
responding aggressively and responding conservatively to potential bubbles. The former has 
a greater likelihood of preventing bubbles but may also cause instability and distortions in 
financial markets as a consequence of excessive intervention. It is also likely to garner 
considerable political ill will. Responding conservatively is less controversial, but it may allow 
a real bubble to grow and provoke a financial crisis. One should bear in mind that the 
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justification for a “clean up” policy stance was that bubbles are hard to identify. This 
observation has not become any less true; it is simply less important now that we have 
witnessed the potential consequences of not intervening. 
As the details of the issue are important, the discussion has focused on how to include asset 
prices in the monetary policy framework. One possibility is to include the prices of financial 
assets and housing as separate arguments in the Taylor rule. Another method that has been 
discussed is including these prices in a broadened measure that would replace the consumer 
price index as the main measure of relevant inflation. 
Given the complexity of financial markets, asset prices should be considered by central 
banks on a more discretionary and judgmental basis. Monetary policy is too blunt an 
instrument to control an asset price bubble. There may also be occasions in which the 
interests of price stability (reducing output gaps and leading inflation towards the target rate) 
and the interests of financial stability (controlling asset price bubbles and other distortions in 
the financial system) may be at odds – for instance, the case of a supply shock that creates a 
boom in asset prices but deflation in the prices of goods. Central banks cannot satisfy both 
objectives effectively with only one policy instrument. A second objective requires a second 
policy instrument. Furthermore, giving objectives to the central bank that go beyond price 
stability and financial stability most likely will end up reducing its effectiveness to achieve 
these two key objectives. 
The instrument best suited to maintain financial stability is macroprudential regulation. It may 
be a straightforward instrument to wield when the central bank is also the main regulatory 
and supervisory authority for the financial system. But for the many instances in which that is 
not the case, macroprudential policy will have to be jointly implemented by the central bank 
and several other agencies. It will be crucial, then, to have explicit collaboration between all 
the relevant regulatory authorities and the central bank. Special attention must be paid to the 
institutional framework to ensure that they will have the incentives to do so. 
Macroprudential regulation should have a dual purpose: reduce the incentives for financial 
institutions to increase leverage during a boom, and make the financial system more robust 
during a bust. It includes the use of procyclical capital requirements and loan provisions to 
moderate lending during a credit boom, placing larger requirements on systemic institutions 
to account for the incentive to become “too big to fail”, and increasing the risk weights 
attached to riskier lending during a boom. 
Making use of these tools to “lean against the wind” will increase pressure on central banks. 
A pertinent example is the US boom in mortgage lending and housing prices that came 
before the current crisis. Before it proved to be unsustainable, the boom seemed to benefit 
everyone: low-income families could obtain easy financing terms, the construction industry 
saw increased activity, the financial system earned large revenues, and political authorities 
enjoyed a higher popularity. Attempts to intervene would likely have been met with fierce 
resistance. 
Central banks’ institutional framework must be strengthened to ensure that they retain their 
autonomy. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the public’s desire for accountability. There 
is understandable opposition to the idea of a powerful institution – and the central bank 
surely is one – that is not accountable to political forces. Transparency and disclosure must 
be improved to satisfy the desire for accountability. If they are to retain their independence, 
central banks must earn the public’s good will. 
With regard to the existing policy framework, the current crisis has not cast doubt on the use 
of inflation targeting (IT). Countries have been affected regardless of whether they had 
implemented inflation targeting. The United States, which was the epicentre of the crisis, 
does not use inflation targeting. 
However, the crisis does leave some lessons for the implementation of IT policy. In the IT 
policy framework, the monetary authority should act when there is a steep decline in the 
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output gap (q – q*) and a decrease in expected inflation that puts the target in jeopardy. 
Given monetary policy’s problematic ineffectiveness when the policy rate is near zero, this 
may require higher targets in the future. 
In addition, central banks will also have to work on several other initiatives. They must 
prepare emergency response guidelines to deal with a crisis, both to reduce moral hazard 
and to diminish the influence of special interest groups. They must broaden their portfolio of 
policy instruments and the policy channels through which they inject liquidity during a crisis. 
They must cooperate with other supervisory agencies to ensure that there is adequate 
leadership to deal with emergencies. They must cooperate with their counterparts in other 
countries. And they must avoid creating implicit insurance for systemically important 
institutions and strengthen prefinanced deposit insurance. 